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Accountability and Transparency in
English Local Government: Moving
from ‘Matching Parts’ to ‘Awkward
Couple’?
LAURENCE FERRY, PETER ECKERSLEY AND ZAMZULAILA ZAKARIA∗
Abstract: Although excessive transparency and accountability demands can have a
counterproductive effect on organisational performance (Bovens, 2005), longstanding
hierarchical accountability structures to ensure financial conformance in English
local government continue to endure. Interestingly however, the previously top-down
regime for performance accountability in English local government has been replaced
by bottom-up mechanisms such as greater transparency and a more open market for
public services. Using the framework developed by Hood (2010), this paper will show
how such reforms mean that transparency and accountability are moving from being
‘matching parts’ to an ‘awkward couple’, and how this has significant implications
for public services.
Keywords: accountability, transparency, English local government, budgeting,
performance measurement
INTRODUCTION
Budgeting and governing in the UK public sector can be viewed as constituting
three acts (Ferry and Eckersley, 2011, 2012 and 2015). In this view, Act 1 is the
spending review that sets out a framework for income and expenditure levels
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over the medium term and Act 2 is the annual budget that enables detailed policy
choices with associated financial impacts and implications. The accountability
and transparency arrangements that afford confidence in the accounting and
internal management practices (Hood, 2010; and Ball, 2012) could be perceived
as constituting Act 3.1 There is some disagreement over how extensive and
independent these arrangements are (or should be) in practice (Heald, 2012), as
well as how much information should be disclosed to the public (Radcliffe, 2008
and 2011; and Funnell, 2011). However, it is generally accepted that auditors
perform a crucial role at this point – not only in the UK, but also in other
jurisdictions – because they provide citizens and their representatives with an
assessment of whether policies are having their desired effect and thereby help
to hold government to account (Bovens, 2005). Indeed, it is generally recognised
that a balance between financial conformance and operational performance is
essential in public sector governance (IFAC, 2011 and 2013; and CIPFA 2010a
and 2010b) – meaning that service outcomes need to be assessed alongside a
financial audit.
This article analyses how the UK Central Government has changed the
accountability and transparency arrangements for local government in England,2
and thereby revised the script for Act 3. Most notably, the Government has
abolished the Audit Commission, a non-departmental body that used to audit
English municipalities and oversee a complex system of top-down performance
assessment for local government. The Audit Commission’s financial auditing
responsibilities have been transferred to the National Audit Office (which used
to focus solely on central government departments), and the local government
performance framework has been replaced by requirements for municipalities
to publish a range of datasets online for public scrutiny (Eckersley et al., 2014).3
Specifically, the article considers the impact of these reforms using a conceptual
approach based on the idea that accountability and transparency are either
‘Siamese twins’, ‘matching parts’ or ‘awkward couple’ (Hood, 2010). In this
context, it illustrates how hierarchical performance accountability arrangements
have been replaced by a bottom-up approach that relies on data transparency
and open competition. As a result, accountability structures for municipalities’
operational performance (the mechanisms that assess whether they deliver
services to a high standard) have been broadened beyond accountants and
the audit profession. Meanwhile, top-down monitoring of financial conformance
(ensuring that spending remains within agreed budgets) has persisted, with
Audit Commission responsibilities in this regard transferring to the National
Audit Office. Although the article focuses on English municipalities, its findings
are equally relevant for other countries because robust accountability procedures
are recognised as good practice around the world.
As O’Neill (2006) argues, transparency only requires the dissemination of
datasets, which means they do not need to be comprehensible to the reader – and
theremay be no control over their quality. As such, the nature of the data that are
published influences how effectively an agent can be held to account, as well as
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the skills and other resources of whoever seeks to analyse the information. This
article applies her analysis to the field of English local government performance
and argues that accountability and transparency are becoming an ‘awkward
couple’ since they do not necessarily combine to produce good governance
(Hood, 2010). Indeed, the transparency requirements that now apply to English
municipalities could actually diminish accountability because the reforms have
significant implications for what is visible and to whom (Hopwood, 1984).
The next section of this paper discusses the literature on accountability and
transparency. It culminates in Hood’s (2010) characterisation of the relationship
between these two concepts and how different worldviews can enable us to
interpret the association in various ways. Hood’s framework is then applied to the
arrangements for monitoring operational performance and financial conformance
in English local government since 1997, before the arguments are summed up
in the conclusion.
The article draws on government publications such as the Open Public
Services white paper (Cabinet Office, 2011), Spending Reviews (HM Treasury,
2007 and 2010b), the Budget (HM Treasury, 2010a) and the Localism Act
(HM Government, 2011), as well as ministerial announcements. In this way,
it identifies how various reforms will influence the relationship between
accountability and transparency in local public services and shape the future
scenario. English local government is often cited as a forerunner in New
Public Management (NPM) practices, since it has been subjected to a range
of NPM-inspired reforms such as Compulsory Competitive Tendering, Best
Value and other performance frameworks in recent decades (Andrews and
van de Walle, 2013). As a result, it provides a particularly relevant example
for other jurisdictions that might be considering changing their performance
management arrangements.
ACCOUNTABILITY DEFINED
Traditionally, accountability has been associated with calling an individual
‘to account’ for their actions to some higher authority, with an emphasis on
external scrutiny and the threat of potential sanctions (Jones, 1992). Although
its meaning has since been extended in a number of different directions (which
led Sinclair (1995) to describe it as having the qualities of a chameleon),
most scholars agree on the importance of a two-way relationship between the
‘agent’ and the ‘principal’, whereby the agent is accountable to the principal
for its actions (Mayston, 1993; and Mulgan, 2000). The identity of the principal
influences the direction in which accountability is exercised: it may be upwards
(to a higher authority), downwards (to citizens or a community), or sideways (as
part of a contract that has been agreed for mutual benefit). Sinclair’s (1995,
p.222) definition of ‘public accountability as a more direct answerability to
the community’ suggests that the ‘principal’ corresponds to the general public.
However, in order to ensure that experts in the field can analyse the relevant
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data and make an informed judgement, accountability may first need to ‘travel’
upwards to Parliament or another authority, before returning downwards to
citizens. We will return to these ideas later in our analysis of how developments
in the accountability procedures for English local government apply to Hood’s
framework.
As mentioned earlier, accountability is often seen as a pre-requisite for
good governance. Bovens (2005) lists five reasons for public accountability
mechanisms, including the need to ensure democratic control of public
institutions, to prevent corruption and abuse of power and to improve public
confidence in governance arrangements. However, although there is little doubt
that these are worthwhile objectives, Bovens is equally clear that ‘more’ controls
are neither necessarily desirable nor lead to exponentially better governance, as
excessive monitoring and rules can hinder decision-making and have a negative
impact on operational performance. In other words, the costs of operating
accountability procedures and systems may outweigh the potential benefits that
they might deliver, and accountability should not be pursued for its own sake
(Mayston, 1993; and De Fine Licht et al., 2014). Some critics take this idea
further by clarifying the intended means and ends of accountability when it is
applied to inputs, processes and outcomes. For example, focusing particularly
on what they classify as the intended means of ‘performance’, which aims to
translate into an end of ‘justice’ or ‘equity’, they find that there is little evidence
to suggest that accountability protocols have delivered their objectives (Dubnick
and Frederickson, 2010, p.1145).
In a Weberian system of public administration, hierarchical management
structures help senior decision-makers to control service delivery through
bureaucratic systems (Bovens, 2005), which justifies the traditional doctrine
of holding ministers to account for policy and performance. However, NPM
reforms, particularly the ‘agencification’, privatisation and outsourcing of a
significant proportion of government functions to alternative providers, have
transformed many of these structures. They have also challenged the traditional
notion of ministerial accountability, due to the notional separation of policy-
making and delivery (or ‘purchaser’ and ‘provider’), and allowed ministers to
divest themselves of responsibility for poor administrative performance, whilst
theoretically remaining accountable to Parliament for overall policy (Mulgan,
2002). Indeed, Bovens (2005) highlights how NPM reforms have led some
to argue that accountability is exercised increasingly ‘horizontally’ through
contractual relationships with suppliers.
In parallel with NPM reforms, it has been argued that UK politicians in central
government have orchestrated a shift towards casting public service consumers
as the principal (Mayston, 1993, p.86). This approach seems to fit with the
dominant British view that the purpose of local government is overwhelmingly
as a service provider, rather than the more democratic perspective (which is
common elsewhere in Europe) that views municipalities as central to the system
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through which communities govern themselves and make political decisions for
the benefit of everyone in the locality (Batley, 1991). However, Mayston (1993)
finds that genuine ‘consumer sovereignty’ remains some distance away, and
warns that the reforms have left a legacy of imperfect monitoring and financial
reporting (see also Shaoul et al., 2012). Indeed, there is an extensive literature
on how outsourcing, privatisation and public private partnerships have reduced
the accountability of public services, partly due to the complexity of supplier
contracts (Pollitt, 1986; Shaoul, 1997; Funnell, 2000; Letza and Smallman, 2001;
Broadbent et al., 2003; Froud, 2003; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008; and English
and Baxter, 2010). As some critics have pointed out:
the strength of agency accountability to programme goals is in reverse ratio to the
distances actual implementation travels and the layers of third parties through which
implementation travels (Dubnick and Frederickso, 2010, p. 1151).
The above discussion focuses overwhelmingly on public accountability struc-
tures and processes that have been introduced and exercised from the top
down. However, given its perceived nature as a pre-requisite of democracy
and good governance, it is worth investigating whether accountability is too
important to be left to accountants and auditors and might (also) be exercised
from the bottom up. Keeping with this, it has been suggested that increased
transparency of government bodies, alongside a move to ‘open up’ public services
to greater competition, could enable citizens and alternative providers to hold
them to account. In particular, the publication of government data online
through the UK Government’s ‘transparency’ agenda has been heralded as a
way of enabling ‘armchair auditors’ to exercise more comprehensive democratic
oversight of public spending (Pickles, 2011) and hold public bodies to account
from the bottom up. Transparency is therefore becoming further entwined with
developments of disclosure and audit (Power, 1999).
TRANSPARENCY DEFINED
Transparency refers to ‘the conduct of business in a fashion that makes
decisions, rules and other information visible from outside’ (Hood, 2010,
p. 989). Taking a historical perspective, Hood (2006) traced how transparency
became an increasingly prevalent concept in discussions of organisation and
governance, even if the word was not always used explicitly. For example, over
recent decades a growing number of Western democracies have introduced
Freedom of Information legislation in the name of enhancing democracy, and
it is notable that several recent government and parliamentary buildings have
incorporated transparency into their very design, as a way of illustrating that
the activities of their occupants should be visible to the public (Heald, 2006a).
One perspective holds that transparency is a ‘human right’, as it can help to
protect against inefficient or oppressive government (Birkinshaw, 2006). Indeed,
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as Ferry and Eckersley (2015b) have identified, transparency can improve
accountability in certain contexts. However, Heald (2006b) argues that we
should not ascribe any intrinsic value to the idea of transparency in government.
Instead, it should be valued instrumentally, because in particular contexts it is a
‘building block’ for other aspects of public policy that it may support or compete
with – including accountability.
Nonetheless, as O’Neill (2006) points out, transparency does not necessarily
improve accountability, since it can result in organisations taking a box-ticking
approach to publishing a huge volume of raw data rather than meaningful
information. If these data are not put into their appropriate context, or cannot
be understood by their audience (the ‘principal’) very easily, they are worthless –
and the ‘agent’ may be even less accountable than at the outset. Furthermore,
as Prat (2005) suggests, the ‘wrong kind’ of transparency – that which concerns
activities rather than consequences – can cause problems because the agent
has an incentive to portray their behaviour as being somehow ‘normal’. As
a result, they may withhold or disregard some useful private information (thus
misleading the principal), or simply try to conform to expectations (and therefore
not attempt to innovate and improve). In this way, the quality and type of
data that are made available determines whether it can be used effectively for
accountability purposes.
Indeed, various scholars have argued that the way transparency mechanisms
are structured shapes their impact on public policy in terms of effectiveness,
equity and democratic accountability. In particular, Heald (2012) suggests that
the core notion of transparency about public expenditure is in making underlying
realities visible and intelligible to identified user communities. It is not enough to
simply produce and distribute data, as transparency needs an audience with the
capacity to understand the data and act upon them as information. For example,
public expenditure needs to be communicated intelligibly to those external to
the organisation (potentially in a manner similar to listed public companies,
where significant private resources are dedicated through accounting standards
development, organisation financial reporting and auditing by independent
auditors).
In the context of public expenditure, Heald (2012) suggests transparency
has five attributes. First, it is found in disciplined information release, without
which manipulative practices of plants, leaks and spin could undermine it.
Second, so that users can drill down to relevant organisational detail from a
‘synoptic’ perspective (Eckersley et al., 2014), it needs to be comprehensive
and founded upon a well designed hierarchy of reporting documents. Third,
capacity issues and structuring political incentives need to be closely linked.
Fourth, it is important to have an independent scrutiny capacity outside the
legislature. Fifth, the role of public audit is vital to effective transparency, both
to validate financial reporting (as per private sector audit) and in its wider
remit of regularity (expenditure accords with authorisation), propriety (absence
of fraud and corruption) and performance (the achievement of value for money).
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THE ACCOUNTABILITY-TRANSPARENCY RELATIONSHIP
This discussion brings us to Hood’s (2010) characterisation of the relationship
between accountability and transparency and how it is widely assumed that both
transparency and accountability are necessary to ensure good governance, with
the former often a pre-requisite of the latter.
His paper articulates three characterisations of the relationship between these
two concepts, and then sets out a framework for understanding which description
might fit best. The three characterisations are:
1. ‘Siamese twins’ – accountability and transparency are not really
distinguishable from one another. The tendency for both terms to be
used together suggests that this is a widely-held interpretation.
2. ‘Matching parts’ – accountability and transparency are separable, but
nevertheless complement one another and are both necessary for
good governance. For example, governments should disclose some
information to the public in order to be held democratically accountable.
3. ‘Awkward couple’ – accountability and transparency do not necessarily
work together and there may be some tension between the two. This view
argues that transparency does not necessarily improve accountability
or governance, since it leads to the agent publishing reams of poor-
quality information that the principal cannot access or analyse easily
(see O’Neill, 2006, for a full discussion).
Hood (2010) also drew on the cultural theory of Douglas (1966, 1970 and
1992) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) to outline four competing ‘worldviews’
(hierarchy, equality, individualism and fatalism) of how conduct is socially
regulated. These perspectives, which explain how it is possible to perceive
the accountability-transparency relationship in various ways, are summarised
in Table 1 and outlined below.
• A hierarchist perspective assumes an established ‘pecking order’ and
accountability is largely exercised ‘upwards’, towards authority figures.
Transparency is probably seen as an instrumental value and therefore
a ‘matching part’ for accountability, although publishing some types of
information might result in them being an ‘awkward couple’. This view
correlates with traditional Weberian administrative systems, particularly
prior to initiatives such as freedom of information.
• An egalitarian worldview interprets accountability as being owed to the
people or community (‘downwards’) and therefore does not restrict access
to information. There is a presumption of openness and disclosure, about
both public and private affairs, perhaps on the basis that transparency is a
human right rather than necessarily a tool for achieving other objectives.
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Table 1
The Nature of Accountability and Transparency within Different
Worldviews (adapted from Hood, 2010)
Worldview
Direction of
Accountability Transparency Regime Characterisation
Hierarchist Upwards, to
authority
Access to public and
private information on
a ‘need to know’ basis
Matching parts, but
potentially awkward
couple
Egalitarian Downwards, to
communities
Presumption of general
openness and disclosure
of public and private
information
Siamese twins
Individualist Horizontally,
between
contracting
parties
Personal privacy and
commercial
confidentiality is
paramount
Matching parts, but
potentially awkward
couple
Fatalist Unpredictable, to
whoever can
demand it
Random access depending
on coincidences and
unpredictable events
Any of the three
As such, the ‘Siamese twins’ interpretation, whereby transparency and
accountability are inseparable from one another, fits most closely.
• An individualist perspective holds that individual needs should prevail
over those of the group, and is therefore less concerned with state
activities. Indeed, it is likely to argue for citizens to be able to choose
alternative providers of public services and thereby exercise accountability
horizontally, through contractual relationships. However, transparency
can be restricted if it undermines privacy or commercial confidentiality.
In most cases the ‘matching parts’ interpretation is most fitting, but in
the event of information published being unfit for purpose, the ‘awkward
couple’ analogy could also apply.
• A fatalist viewpoint stresses that actions have unintended consequences
and it is therefore impossible to make a link between accountability
and transparency. As a result, any of the three characterisations
might apply in any given situation, but the randomness of human
interactions means we cannot predict which type of relationship is likely to
develop.
The above characterisation of accountability and transparency is now considered
in the context of arrangements for monitoring financial conformance and
operational performance in English local government since 1997.
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ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The UK New Labour Government that was elected in 1997 extended the
framework of top-down arrangements aimed at improving the accountability of
local government in England. In terms of financial conformance, Comprehensive
Spending Reviews were conducted to provide multi-year frameworks for public
expenditure between 1998 and 2010. These frameworks stipulated the overall
level of central grants that would be distributed to English local government
during the period, with individual municipality allocations decided on an annual
basis (HM Treasury, 2007). In addition, the Secretary of State for Communities
and Local Government retained (and, on occasions, exercised) the right to ‘cap’
individual levels of Council Tax, which represented the main source of finance
over which municipalities had some autonomy – even if it only accounted for
around one-quarter of their revenue. Finally, towards the end of the 2000s,
the Treasury required all public sector organisations, including municipalities,
to adopt the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Since these
standards were developed for private sector companies, who need to report
solely to shareholders rather than wider stakeholders (Shaoul et al., 2012), this
shift highlights that local government was accountable ‘upwards’ to central
government for its financial conformance, rather than ‘downwards’ to citizens.
Taking all of these factors together, there was an undeniably hierarchical
approach to monitoring local government financial conformance during this
period. Since budgetary reporting systems were designed to complement the
hierarchical process, and auditors were provided with relevant data that were fit
for purpose, we can also use the matching parts analogy to describe the relation-
ship between accountability and transparency.4
In parallel with these developments in budgetary procedures, the govern-
ment also added to the existing hierarchical arrangements for performance
accountability. In particular, it introduced public service agreements (PSAs) that
linked funding to central government department outputs and outcomes. These
PSAs operated alongside (though did not necessarily complement) the existing
Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) requirement for departments to
report on the impact of their spending through an output and performance
analysis. PSAs were supposed to cascade down from central government
departments to their relevant ‘delivery’ organisations in the form of specific
objectives that would contribute to the overall aims of the parent department.
For example, English municipalities were asked to report on their progress
against a range of indicators that (theoretically at least) monitored how well
they were delivering outcomes on behalf of central government. The Audit
Commission then reported through its performance management frameworks
on the extent to which each municipality’s spending decisions delivered desired
outputs and outcomes, which was initially through its Best Value regime, and
subsequently formed part of its Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA)
and then Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA). CPA gave each municipality
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a ‘star’ rating according to how well it appeared to be performing against
the targets. In 2009 CPA was replaced by CAA, which monitored how well
public bodies were delivering outcomes in the local area. These outcomes
were agreed by local public sector organisations, but had to be approved by
central government through its regional offices. Therefore, since municipalities
reported ‘upwards’ to a centralised target regime, and bodies such as the
Audit Commission could access relevant information on a ‘need to know’ basis,
we can see how the Government’s arrangements for monitoring operational
performance centrally also corresponded with the hierarchist interpretation
of accountability.5 In addition, since auditors could process and analyse these
data, and produced reports that enabled elected officials and citizens to hold
municipalities to account, we can see how the ‘matching parts’ analogy applies.
Since taking office in 2010, the Coalition Government (consisting of Conser-
vatives and Liberal Democrats) has retained many aspects of the centralised
system for ensuring financial conformance. These include multi-year spending
reviews (although they are no longer described as being ‘comprehensive’ and
one spending period was truncated by the general election of 2015), the annual
local government grant settlement, financial audits and adherence to IFRS.
Although some changes to these arrangements have been introduced, which may
at face value suggest that the hierarchical approach to financial conformance
is weakening, in fact it will persist. For example, in tune with its rhetoric of
‘localism’, the new government removed the ‘ring-fences’ from many of its grant
funding streams to municipalities, ostensibly to give them greater freedom to
decide how to allocate their resources. In reality, because the overall level of
funding to local government fell by 26% over the initial four-year spending
review period (HM Treasury, 2010b), municipalities will have far less ability to
spend money on local priorities. Similarly, the power to ‘cap’ rises in Council
Tax has been replaced by a new requirement for municipalities to organise local
referenda to approve any increase that the Secretary of State deems is ‘excessive’.
In fact, since no municipality would expect to win such a referendum, they are
extremely unlikely to risk having to organise one, and therefore essentially
remain accountable ‘upwards’ to central government through a cap in all but
name (Ferry et al., 2015). Finally, although the Coalition has abolished the Audit
Commission, it has transferred the task of overseeing municipality financial
audits to the National Audit Office, and thereby maintained its control over
local government expenditure. As such, the hierarchical approach and matching
parts analogy will continue, in spite of these reforms to financial conformance
mechanisms. This is because central government has maintained its control over
local expenditure through a hierarchical system of funding settlements, IFRS,
annual audits and Council Tax compliance. Together with the reduction in grant
income, these mechanisms will mean that municipalities remain accountable
‘upwards’ to central government for their financial management, rather than
‘downwards’ to residents.
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As we outlined earlier, ‘too much’ accountability can have a negative effect
on service outcomes, because excessive rules constrain officials and hinder
decision-making (Mayston, 1993; and Bovens, 2005). In keeping with this line
of argument, the Coalition Government has abolished many of the hierarchical
performance accountability mechanisms for local government, including the
Audit Commission and CAA (the National Audit Office has only assumed
responsibility for auditing municipal finances). Extolling the virtues of cutting
‘red tape’, ministers claimed to have removed around 4,700 central targets
so that municipalities ‘will be free to focus on protecting frontline services’
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010b).
In accordance with its rhetoric of ‘localism’ and the ‘Big Society’, the Gov-
ernment has replaced this architecture by a system of bottom-up accountability
measures. Most notably, its drive for increasing the ‘transparency’ of public
administration, which builds on the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and
previous ‘open government’ initiatives, has resulted in the publication of vast
amounts of data relating to public bodies. Ministers have stressed the importance
of giving private citizens, or ‘armchair auditors’, access to information about
how their taxes are being spent through this transparency agenda. For example,
English municipalities are now required to publish details of all transactions
worth over £500, as well as the salaries of senior staff and some performance
information (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010a).
Although ministerial announcements still suggest that transparency is a
tool to improve organisational efficiency rather than a human right (see, for
example, Pickles, 2011), these developments nonetheless suggest a shift towards
an egalitarian worldview, in which accountability is exercised ‘downwards’ from
public bodies to citizens. As we shall see however, the transparency agenda
sits alongside other policy initiatives that aim to increase the share of public
services delivered by private and voluntary providers. These ideas actually
fit more closely with the individualist perspective, since they will reduce the
role of the state and will result in accountability being exercised increasingly
horizontally through contractual relationships. Most importantly, the ‘right to
challenge’ that features in the 2011 Localism Act allows alternative suppliers to
challenge a municipality on the basis that they could provide services better or
cheaper than the incumbent provider (HM Government, 2011). The data that
are published through the transparency agenda will help private and voluntary
sector organisations produce informed challenges to incumbent suppliers and
ultimately assume responsibility for delivering a greater share of public services
(Eckersley et al., 2014). In a similar vein, the Open Public Services white
paper (Cabinet Office, 2011) sets out how users should be able to choose to
access public services from various providers and thereby hold them to account
through market mechanisms. As such, these initiatives appear to improve the
transparency and accountability of public bodies, because they are providing the
‘principal’ (the service user) with undiluted information about the activities of
their ‘agent’ (the service provider).
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Whether by accident or design, we can see how this new system of
performance accountability is actually closer to the individualist (rather than
egalitarian) worldview, since it is exercised horizontally through contractual
arrangements and consumer choice.6 Hood (2010) argues that such a perspective
normally results in a ‘matching parts’ interpretation of the relationship between
accountability and transparency, but cautions that a ‘mismatch’ could result
in them becoming an awkward couple. Analysis of the Coalition Government’s
initiatives outlined above shows that the nature of the information that becomes
available is likely to cause such a mismatch. This is because citizens are now
invited to assess organisational performance on the basis of gigabytes of raw
data, without assistance from professional auditors. In keeping with O’Neill
(2006), these datasets are inaccessible and meaningless to most members of the
public, who are not experts in public management or audit and will lack relevant
contextual information. Instead, large private sector suppliers will be the major
beneficiaries, because they will possess the resources to analyse these data, and
also have an incentive to do so – namely to inform a challenge to the incumbent
provider (Eckersley et al., 2014). As Funnell (2000) has identified, outsourced or
privatised public services are often neither transparent nor publicly accountable,
because suppliers are reluctant to make information public on the grounds of
commercial confidentiality and there is an absence of democratic oversight.
Moreover, Skelcher (2005) highlights that contractors possess more knowl-
edge about the nature of the work they have undertaken compared to
their clients, and this ‘information asymmetry’ could mean that supposedly
transparent public services actually become increasingly opaque. In this
situation it becomes questionable whether accountability could even be exercised
horizontally by competing suppliers. As such, we can see how accountability
and transparency form an awkward couple in the new system of performance
monitoring (see Table 2).
Table 2
Characterisations of Financial Conformance and Operational
Performance in English Local Government Since 1997
Financial Conformance Operational Performance
Worldview Characterisation Worldview Characterisation
1997–2010 Hierarchist Matching parts Hierarchist Matching parts
2010- Hierarchist Matching parts Individualist Awkward couple
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper has used the conceptual framework developed by Hood (2010) to
illustrate the changing nature of accountability and transparency in English
local government, focusing on the post-1997 era. It has highlighted how top-down
structures to ensure financial conformance have endured throughout this period,
in spite of the fact that substantial demands for transparency and accountability
can have a potentially deleterious impact on organisational performance. These
structures correspond to a ‘matching parts’ characterisation of the relationship
between accountability and transparency. In contrast however, since taking
office in 2010 the Coalition Government has abolished the top-down approach
to monitoring local government outputs and outcomes. This regime has been
replaced by data transparency and a more open market in public services, which
ostensibly allows users to exercise accountability from the bottom up by choosing
from a range of providers.
The transparency agenda suggests that an egalitarian perspective may be
most applicable to this new scenario, because accountability is supposedly
being exercised ‘downwards’ and there is a presumption that information
should be disclosed. However, complementary initiatives aimed at increasing the
share of public services that are delivered by private companies and voluntary
organisations mean that the situation actually relates most closely to the
individualist interpretation. In addition, since the supposed principals (private
citizens) will not have the necessary skills and experience to interpret and
analyse the raw data that municipalities are required to publish, there will be a
mismatch between transparency and accountability and these two concepts will
be cast in an ‘awkward couple’ relationship.
These developments, together with the fact that formal performance
assessments of local government have been abolished, mean that hierarchical
accountability will be much more focused on managing spend (financial
conformance) rather than on what has been achieved for such spend (oper-
ational performance). Furthermore, the hierarchical accountability structures
for financial conformance are likely to be much more influential than the
horizontal mechanisms that ostensibly aim to monitor operational perfor-
mance. This is not only due to the fact that the centralised system for
financial control remains very comprehensive, withministers exerting significant
control over local government finance (particularly in an era of austerity),
but also because the ‘transparency’ reforms will actually lead to citizens
having a more opaque picture of local government performance than was
the case previously. As a result, public bodies will concentrate much more
on financial stewardship than improving the efficiency and effectiveness
of their services. In this way, transparency initiatives will actually reduce
the accountability of English local government rather than increase it –
something that has significant implications for citizens and users of public
services. Other jurisdictions that may be considering undertaking similar public
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management reforms should consider whether such an outcome would be
desirable.
In spite of all that, it is worth remembering that if the prime aim of the UK
Government is to reduce expenditure, the extent to which public bodies have
been able to keep within reduced budgets should also be the overriding focus
of any audit exercise. Since the Coalition made it clear that its priority was to
reduce the public deficit (HM Treasury, 2010a and 2010b), it could be argued
that the emphasis on financial conformance is justified.
However, this narrow view restricts the ability of individual municipalities to
set and pursue their own objectives, and from being judged on their performance
in an informed and objective manner. In addition, cases such as the Mid
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, which a public inquiry found became so
focused on financial conformance that patient care was not a priority, have
highlighted the need for public bodies to ensure that they do not lose sight of
their overriding purpose. In this example it was clear to the public (and also
to leading politicians) that financial conformance should not take precedence
over an acceptable level of clinical performance.7 As we have found however,
recent changes to transparency and accountability procedures suggest that this
principle is not being applied within English local government.
NOTES
1 In times of uncertainty there may also be a prologue to these Acts in the form of an emergency
budget (Ferry and Eckersley, 2012).
2 The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have responsibility for
local government elsewhere in the UK.
3 Note that although these changes have transformed the situation for English local government,
in many other parts of the public sector (in particular the NHS), the level of top-down
performance assessment has actually increased (see Talbot, 2012).
4 Indeed, these characterisations can also be applied to pre-1997 accountability systems at
central government level, such as Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB), which required
departments to adhere to a single system for planning, controlling and reporting on public
spending with a view to improving public accountability (Likierman, 1998 and Heald, 2005).
5 Government ministers may have felt that this system was justified because it ensured that
citizens were able to access independent assessments of municipality performance. In Hood’s
(2010) framework we can view this as accountability travelling ‘upwards’ to Parliament, before
changing direction and going ‘downwards’ from elected representatives to citizens.
6 If, as the open public services white paper suggests (Cabinet Office, 2011), the Government’s
intention was to enable private and third sector organisations to make informed bids and
ultimately deliver more public services, then this can be seen as part of a deliberate strategy.
However, if we believe ministerial pronouncements that the transparency agenda is primarily
about empowering individual citizens (Pickles, 2011), the fact that this will not happen bears
out Wildavsky and Pressman’s (1984) analysis of the problematic nature of implementing
central government policy at the local level.
7 The House of Commons sitting in Westminster Hall discussed ‘Accountability and Trans-
parency in the NHS’ as its main business on 14 March, 2013, which one of the authors attended
in the public gallery. The Order of Business notes, ‘That this House believes that . . . it is clear
that accountability and transparency are of paramount importance to patient safety and trust
in the NHS . . . ’
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